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It is the right of the directors of the public schools to prescribe the hours of
attendance of the pupils, and to make a proper system of punishments for absence,
&e.
In doing this the public rights and convenience must govern, without regard to
the wishes or convenience or private preferences of parents or others.
This rule applies to the attendance of the children Qn public or private religious
worship on week-days during the prescribed hours for school.
Such purpose doqs
not excuse violation of the rules of the schools.

Ix equity on bill and answer. The complainants were members
of the Catholic Church in the village of Brattleborough, and it appeared that on June 4th 1875, the priest of the said church, acting
in behalf of the complainants, sent to the respondents, who were
the prudential committee of that school district, a request that the
Catholic children might be excused from attendance at school on
"all holy days." and especially on that day, being holy Corpus
Christi day. To this note the committee replied that the request
could not be granted, ds it *ould involve closing some of the schools
and greatly interrupting others.
It further appeared that about sixty Catholic children, by direction and command .of their parents, were kept from school to attend
religious 'services on siid 4th of June, being, as stated in the
bill, "holy Corpus Christi day." A few of them applied for admission to the schools in the afternoon of that day, and all, or
nearly all, so applied the next morning, when they were told by
the committee that, as they had absented themselves without permission, and 'in violation of the rules of the school, which they
well understood, they could not return without an assurance from
their parents,'or their priest, that in future they would comply
with the rules of the schools, the committee assuring said children,
and many of their parents, and also the priest, that if said schools
-would not again be interrupted in like manner they would gladly
admit said children to them ; that said priest and parents refused
to comply with such proposal, and claimed that on all days which
they regard as holy they may, as matter of right, take their children from the schools without any regard to the rules thereof.
The bill prayed an injunction against the committee, defendants
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from preventing the admission of the complainants' children to the
said schools, &c.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-[After stating the facts in detail.] The ground
and reason of the exemption asked for in this case, as stated in
the bill, are, that the parents of said children were members of the
Catholic Church, and they were directed by the priest of said church
to attend religious services on said 4th day of June and have their
children do so, as already more fully stated. The legal ground and
reason of the relief prayed for are indicated by the expressions in
the bill, namely--" their (the orators') constitutional right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences, without being abridged in the enjoyment of their civil rights ;" and
their "right to exercise parental authority and government over
their children as regards their moral training and culture ;" which,
when put in the form of direct and explicit statement, is in effect,
that the enforcing of the rules of suspension by the committee upon
the children of the orators violated the rights of the orators under
Art. III. of the constitution of the state ; and violated also the
legal right of the orators to control their children in the matter of
attending the public schools of the district, as against the right
of the committee in the same behalf.
It is the duty of this court to decide whether either of these
propositions is maintainable. The article in the constitution on
which the former of these depends is, "That all men have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to
the dictates of their own consciences and understandings, as in
their opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and that no
man ought to, or of right can, be compelled to attend any religious
worship, &c., contrary to the dictates of his conscience; nor can
any man be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a
citizen on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of
religious worship; and no authority can or ought to be vested in
or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control, the rights of conscience in the
free exercise of religious worship ; nevertheless, every sect or denomination of Christians ought to observe the Sabbath, or Lord's
day, and keep up some sort .of religious worship, which to them
shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God." In the
BARRETT,
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light of that article, the former of these propositions, if critically
considered in its relation to the case made by the bill, obviously
cannot be maintained; for the action of the committee touches not
nor affects the worship of Almighty God by the orators, whether
buch worship be in one way or another, or not at all; nor does it
touch or affect their religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of re,
ligious worship ; nor does it in any manner interfere with or control
the rights of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.
That article in the constitution looks only to the personal conscience of the individual as relates to' his personal worship of
Almighty iGod. It looks only to the personal relation of the individual to his God, both as to belief and worship; and not to the
relation that the individual may sustain to others in respect to their
belief and worship. The not consenting that the children of the
orators might leave the schools for the purpose of attending divine
worship on the day in question did not touch the belief of the orators as to the character of that day, nor did it touch or control the
free exercise by them of religious worship according to their belief
and conscience, nor is anything to that effect alleged or intimated
in the bill.
Still further, it may be rematked that the bill does not present
•its n matter of corisclenoe, either with the orators or their children,
that the children should'attend service on that day; but only represents that it is a -holy day in the church, and accustomed to be
observed as such. No divine authority for it is quoted or asserted,
and its observance, in this instance, by the orators and their children, by attending religious services, is put upon the direction of
tlie priest, without showing or asserting that anything of religious
conscience was involved in obeying, or not obeying, that direction.
'Yielding to supervening authority exercised by a recognised superior is one thing; but it is not necessarily, nor impliedly, the same
thing as obedience to the dictates of the inward monitor and
avenger.I Again, when the facts set forth in the answer are considered, it
seems very apparent that only the attendance of the orators' chil*len on the morning session of the schools on that 4th of June
involved any matter of conscience in relation to the day; for many
Catholics in the village were about their accustomed business and
labor during that day as on other days, "and many of their
children were at play in the streets and elsewhere during that day,"
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and some of the scholars that had been taken from the schools to
attend the religious service presented themselves for attendance in
school in the afternoon. Hence, as to the matter of fact as shown
by the bill and answer, it would be very difficult to find that the
observance of the day is binding on the Catholic conscience; and
the bill and answer furnish the only legitimate evidence we have
on that subject; and this difficulty is considerably enhanced by
the fact, that, up to the 4th of June 1874. that conscience bad
never caused it to be required that the Catholic children should
be absent at all from the schools on that day.
It is proper also to state explicitly that, if the action of the committee, either in the making or the enforcing of the rule, was
unlawful in this instance, and was the subject of remedy by suit in
chancery, or at law, such suit should not be in the name of the
parents, but of the children, as the real party plaintiff.
What is thus presented seems to show sufficient ground and reason for holding that the bill cannot be maintained on the proposition as to the constitutional rights of the orators. But having
regard to the character of the subject, and to the scope of the arguments that have been addressed to us, we are disposed to consider
that proposition in a broader view.
To this end, suppose the children of the orators to be the orators,
and to have set forth as true of themselves all that the bill contains
as to the church, and the day, and their priest, and the application
to, and refusal by, their teachers and committee, and the attending
on the religious services, and the being excluded from the schools,
and the action of the committee in respect thereto; and to have
been answered in every material respect as the bill of the orators
is answered. In such case the ground of complaint and remedy
would be, that their (the children's) rights under Art. III. had been
violated by the action of the committee. Could it be maintained?
This is really the question which counsel for the orators seem to
regard as being before the court.
This brings into consideration the scope and purpose of that
article of the constitution. It is noticeable as bearing on the subject,
that this is the first instance of the assertion of what is now claimed
for that article. The article was in the original constitution of 1777,
and has been continued from that time to the present. In that
original constitution, also, the 40th section was, "A school or schools
shall be established in each town by the legislature for the conve-
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nient ingtruction of youth," &c. By the revision of 1785-ratified in
1786-that article was changed in phrase, but not in sense or effect,
and thus it has remained, being sec. 41 in our present constitution.
The legislature, in pursuance of said provision of the constitution,
has been continuously making provision for such schools; and such
schools have existed and been in operation in all the towns in the
state down to the present time, with great variety of detail as to
organization, administration and requirement, even to compulsory
attendance by force of specific enactment. While those two articles (III. and 41) have thus, side by side, been in force to every
practical intent, all forms of religious belief and unbelief, characterizing the various sects and denominations of men relatively to
religion, and all forms of church organization, based on such forms
of belief, have been in existence and operation, with all the details
of religious worship and service, professedly involving the conscience and its demands peculiar to each differing sect; and yet
this is the first instance in which it has been asserted that the administration of our common public schools, under the contemporary
constitution in that behalf and the enacted laws, has violated any
rights accorded by said Art. III. It is to be noticed still further,
that, while those two articles have been in force, and the successive
lkgislatures have been enacting laws under which schools have been
going on through the immediate agency and action of committees
and teachers, vested with the same offibial authority as those now in
office, councils of censors, charged by the same constitution with
the duty of noting infractions of that instrument by the legislature,
and vested with the function of initiating alterations of the constitution itself, have been chosen and in official. action every seven
years, and yet nobody has suggested that the legislation under
see. 41, or the actions of committees and teachers under that
legislation, or that sec. 41 itself, has trenched on anybody's rights
of conscience under said Art. III. This is stated, not as showing
that the action of the committee in this case did not violate such
rights, but as showing that the present claim for that article by
these orators is of novel imvre88ion, as we say of a proposition, or
question of law, when for the first time presented for judicial
consideration.
It now behooves that we should call to mind what, as matter of
history, was the occasion, and what the purpose of that Art. III.
The history of the Puritans in England, and especially of those
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who were known as the New England Pilgrims, shows the occasion;
and in this regard it is in point to refer to the religious history of
the continent of Europe for several centuries next prior to the
formation of our government. The government of England and
the governments of the continent had no written organic constitutions defining the powers of the governing authority on the one
hand, and defining and guaranteeing the rights and privileges of.
the subject on the other. The subject lived in subordination to the
law-making and law-executing power-he individually, or all the
subjects collectively, not being recognised as having rights and
privileges, only as they should be accorded to them by those powers. The British idea of the British government was sharply expressed in 1775, in the answer, written by Dr. Johnson, to the
resolutions and address of the American Congress-" that the King
and Parliament have the power of disposing, without the consent
of the subjects, of their lives, liberties and properties." [The italics
are in the authentic print.] Sovereignty was not derived from the
subjects, but it supervened upon them by "divine right," in the
form and character of what was called "the government." Church
and state were indissolubly connected, the church dogmatizing the
faith, and the state enacting it into legal requirement, with disabilities and penalties. The disabilities on the score of religious
faith and practice, which snbects were made to experience-the
penalties that confronted non-conformity in England-the horrors which hunted and avenged imputed heresy, at times, both
in England and on the continent, had made those who were not of
the religious faith required or approved by the governing powers,
and who for that reason bad gone forth to the desolations of the
desert and the wilderness to escape the eye, and ear, and arm of
such powers, feel and appreciate the importance, in creating governments for themselves, of seeing to it that such governments
should not have the right, at least, to subjugate them to like disabilities, penalties and horrors.
In the first constitution of the state of New York, drafted by
John Jay, chairman of a committee of his peers in character, and
some of them in ability and learning, and adopted on the 20th of
April 1777, with but one negative vote in the convention that
framed and established it, Art. 38-corresponding to Art. III. in
our constitution of the same year-shows in direct expression, the
occasion and purpose of the article-an occasion and purpose com-
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mon to the colonies then just enfranchised by the Declaration of
Independence. I copy thus: "And whereas we are required by
the benevolent principles of rational liberty, not only to expel civil
tyranny, but also to guard against the spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked
priests and princes have scourged mankind: this convention doth
further, in the name and by the authority of the good people of
this state, ORDAIN, DETERMINE and DECLARE, that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall for ever hereafter be allowed
within this state to all mankind: Provided, that the liberty of
conscience hereby granted shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace and safety of this state."
When our constitution was first framed and adopted, no occasion
had been given for regarding the grievance that is now complained
of; so, such grievance could not have been in mind as an object
specially to be provided against in the, making of that Art. III.
On the other hand, the government-making people of New England,
in the causes that had led to its first settlement by the Pilgrims, and
Dy their children, and by after emigrants and their children, had
qver deep and fresh in mind occasion and reason for the provisions
of that article. And nothing could more fully, pointedly and specifically indicate the nature of such occasion and reason than the
language of the article itself. It was designed by it to secure to
every subject equal civil rights, irrespective of his religious faith;
so that his being a Catholic or a Protestant-his being a Calvinist,
or an Arminian-his being an orthodox evangelical, or a freethinker-his being a Baptist, or a Universalist-an Episcopalian,
or a Quaker, should not make him the object of discriminating
legislation or judicial judgment to his disadvantage, as compared
Vith those of different faith and practice, so that no law should be
aimed or executed against him because he professed and practised
one form of religious belief, or disbelief, rather than another, within
the limits of personal immunity consistent with good order and the
peace of society under the government. It was designed to debar
the law-making and law-administering powers from enacting, or
adjudging, that, unless the subject should profess a prescribed
system of faith, and become a member of a prescribed religious
organization, and conform in his worship to the prdscribed ritual,
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. he should not be entitled to the same personal rights, privileges
and enjoyments under the government as those who should do so.
It was designed to secure absolute equality before the law of all
subjects under the law, whatever might be their faith, or notions
in the matter of religion. And as a result, may not a Catholic be
a Catholic, as freely as a Protestant may be a Protestant, with no
law aimed at him because he is a Catholic and not a Protestant?
It would seem to be trifling with a momentous subject, to claim
that Art. Ill. was designed to prohibit the legislature from enacting
any law, the carrying into effect of which" might interfere with tha
wishes, and tastes, and feelings of any of the citizens in the matter
of religion, and even with the performance of religious rites that
should be regarded as matter of conscientious duty on the part of
some of the subjects of the realm. Government, with reference to
the ends designed to be secured and served by its existence and
action, is altogether a practical matter-not speculative, fanciful,
sentimental, or impracticable. It performs its functions, and works
out its results, by the instrumentality of laws enacted and laws
administered-laws adapted to the subject-matter of them, and to
the accomplishing of the ends designed, and operating equally and
alike upon all who come within their scope.
One of the chief ends of the government is to provide means
and facilities for developing, and educating, and training the young
into virtuous and intelligent me:a and women. This is recognised
and emphasized by the section of the constitution already referred
to as to schools; and which since 1786 has been in these words
"Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and
immorality ought to be constantly kept in force and duly executed,
and a competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each
town for the convenient instruction of youth."
As already suggested, the constitution proceeds upon the
assumption that this can be done consistently with Art. III. In
pursuance of that assumption, the legislature, through the whole
course of our existence as a state, has been active and earnest, and
considerate, in the making of laws for the, existence and supp6it
and management of what is meant by "schools in each town." In
so doing it has never aimed to make, nor has it ever made, any
provision that discriminates or distinguishes in its operation,
between persons of different religious sects. All are subjected
alike to the law and its administration. The Methodist who regards
VOL. XXIV.-73
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his camp-meeting as demanding as much of his conscience, as the.
Episcopalian does his Christmas or Lent; the Episcopalian, who
regards the feast and fast days of his church, as demanding as
much of his conscience, as the Catholic does his holy "Corpus
Christi :" the Congregationalist and Pr esbyterian, and Baptist, and
other sects, who care for none of these things, and whose prayer
meetings and protracted meetings demand as much of their consciences, as in the case of the others before named, and the man of
no preference and no religion, all, and, all their children, are subjected alike to the school laws, and to their administration.
Art. III. was not designed to subjugate the residue of the constitution, and the important institutions and appliances of the
government provided by the enacted laws for serving the highest
interests of the public as involved in personal condition and social
relations, to the peculiar faith, personal judgment, individual will
or-wish of any one in respect to religion, however his conscience
might demand, or protest. In that respect it is implied, that while
the individual may hold the utmost of his religious faith, and all
his ideas, notions, and preferences as to religious worship and
Tractice, he holds, them- in reasonable .subseriency -to the equal
rights of 'otbers, and to the paramount interests of the public as
*depending .orl, xpd to, tio served by, general laws and uniferm
4dministration. RJghts of conscience! and schools, under.the conptiution, were, when that instrument was made, and have been,
during all its contintanqe, to be 1armonized with practicable
consistency---the schools under section 41 not to be subordinated
to the righ.ts of conscience under Art. III. any more than the
rights of conscience under Art. III *re to be subjected to the
rights as to schools under section 41.
And, as bearing pointedly on this view, it is of interest to notice
the change 'that was zoade in the constitution of. 1777 by the
revision of 1786," Sect. 40 of the former began, as already quoted:
"A school or schools shall be established in each town by the
legislature for the conyenient.instruction of youth," and continuing
"with stch salaries to the, masters, paid by each town; making
proper use of the school lands in each town, thereby to .enable
them to instruct youth at -low prices. One grammar school in
each county, and one university in this state ought to be established
by the General Assembly." Sect. 41 of that constitution of 1777
w s: "Lws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of
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vice and immorality shall be made and constantly kept in force;
and provision shall be made for their due execution; and- all
religious societies and bodies of men that have or may hereafter be
united and incorporated for the advancement of religion and
learning, or for other pious and charitable purposes, shall be
encouraged and protected in the enjoyment of the privileges,
immunities and estates which they in justice ought to enjoy, under
guch regulations, as the General Assembly of this state shall
direct." It is thus seen, that, in the original constitution, "the
encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and immorality"
were associated in the same section with the provision for the protection and encouragement of "religious societies, and bodies of
men, united and incorporated for the advancement of religion and
learning." That section did not embrace or contemplate "the
schools in each town "-they, together with "one grammar-school
in each county, and one university in this state," constituting the
separate subject of the preceding section.
By the revision of 1786, that section 40 was incorporated into
said section 41, immediately after the first clause, as is shown by
section 41 of our present constitution, already recited. From all
which it is plain that, in those early times, reliqion and learning,
under the constitution and the laws to be enacted, were deemed to
be compatible, and that schools of all grades, from the "schools in
each town" to the university, were to be the subjects of legislation
under the constitution; and it is especially plain that the "sch9ols
in each town," as early as 1786, were combined with, if not given
the precedence to, religious societies and bodies of men, as an
instrumentality of the government, by means of laws, "for the
encouragement of virtue, and prevention of vice and immorality."
In conclusion on this topic, as we cannot improve, so we adopt the
language of Judge POLAND, in Williams v. School Districtin NewJane, 33 Verm. 275: "Without making further reference
to the almost numberless acts of the legislature, exhibiting the
most active watchfulness and fostering care for the cause of popular
education, enough has already been stated to show that the whole
subject of the maintenance and support of our common schools has
ever been regarded in this state, as one not only of public usefulness, but of public necessity, and one which the state in its
sovereign character was bound to sustain."
We now proceed to remark, that it stands out so plain as not to
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be matter for debate, even if it be not expressly conceded, that
schtols, in order to realize the intent of the constitution in their
behalf, must be subjected to system and order under established
rules. Hence, the law charges the committee with the duty. of
"adopting all requisite measures for the inspection, examination
and regulation of the schools, and the improvement of the scholars
in learning :" Gen. Stat.' ch. 22, sect. 39.
Let it be granted that parents and others may, upon their own
respective reasons, control the attendance of the scholars, as
against the official right of the committee in that behalf, and prac-tically, the ground of system, and order, and improvement, has no
'existence. For the parents and guardians of the scholars may,
each on his own motion, and on his own notions, withhold their
-respective scholars from the schools. In this respect, so far as its
effect on the schools is concerned, it makes no difference whether
the occasion and motive involve conscience, will, whim or the
pocket.
Now, when this matter of conscience, as against the requirements of the law, is brought to the test, the practical result of
'what is claimed by the orators in this case is shown to be so im.practicable, not otherwise to characterize it, as to preclude further
:discussion. If a Catholic citizen should be serving on a jury in
the midst of a trial, when divine service in his church on holy
"Corpus Christi" should be in progress, would it be a violation of
,*isrights under said Art. III. to comnpel him to keep his seat and
serve through the trial ? The same me ay be asked of the Jew or
the Seventh-day Baptist, who should be required to do like service
on Saturday. The same may be asked of a devout Methodist,
when a camp-meeting or a love-feast should be in progress in his
vicinage. If either or all should refuse to serve; would their rights
of conscience under Art. III. be a valid defence in a prosecution
for the penalty in such case provided ? Suppose a Catholic sheriff
should have.in his hands some process which it became his official
-duty to serve during the time that divine service in his church on
some holy day should be in progress, would his rights of conscience
-under Art. III. be a good plea in bar to an action for official de-fault by reason of attending said service "for conscience sake,"
-instead of -making service of the process?
But enough of test
and illustration.
Let it be repeated then that, that article in the constitution
-
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was not designed to exempt any person, or persons of any sect,
on the score of conscience as to matters of religion, from the operation and obligatory force of the generatl laws of the state, authorized by other portions of the same instrument, and designed
to serve the purposes contemplated by such other portions; it was
not designed to exempt any persons from the same subjection that
others are under to the laws and their administration onl the score
that such subjection at times would interfere with the performance
of religious rites, and the observance of religious ordinances, which
they would deem it their duty to perform and observe but for such
subjection. While all stand on equal footing under the laws, both'
as to benefits and privileges proffered, and as to exactions made,
and liabilities and penalties imposed, no one's rights of conscience,
as contemplated by said Art. III., arc violated in a legal sense.
And it is fitting here to remark, that this court have to deal
with the subject as jurists, regarding the constitution, and the
laws, and what is done under them, with reference to principles
and reasons that appertain to the subject in its legal elements,
qualities and aspects, and niot as religionists, not as sectaries, not
as those who regard something besides the government as of ultimate supremacy in the affairs of men on earth, but as those who
regard the government created by the constitution, and the lawsmade under the authority, and within the scope of the constitution, as the ultimate sovereignty in this state, and as equally obligatory and effectual upon all. It is not our official duty to discuss, nor our official prerogative to pronounce upon the policy or
propriety of the provisions and requirements of the con .-itution,
or of the laws enacted conformably to the constitution, iii view of
their bearing upon the matter of personal religion and morals, or
on the matter of religious, moral and secular education ; but it is
only our province to interpret and give application and effect to
the constitution and laws as they exist. The court does not make
the law, either constitutional or statutory, but only administers it'
in cases as they are presented for consideration and decision. The
part of the opinion in Donahue v. Richards, 38 Maine 379, and
the cases cited, which bear on this ground of the present case, are
worthy of attention by all who may be interested in the subject.
Pursuing no further the discussion of this ground and aspect ofthe case, it is proper here to remark, that the note of the priest to
the committee did not state any groun,d for asking for the exemp-
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tion from attending school on the particular day in question, nor
was the application limited to that day, nor did it name that day
at all; but it was an application for a dispensation, as matter of
favor on the part of the committee, from attendance " on all holy
days," with nothing indicating a claim of right made upon the
committee ; and so, no cause, reasonable or otherwise, was presented, in view of which the committee Icould be put in a position
of official fault by not giving leave of absence on that day.
Then, as to the condition, on which only they would let the absenting scholars return to their schools-in that they asserted
their right to enforce the rule of exclusion for the residue of the
term. So far as rights -of conscience under the constitution arc
involved, they were not precluded of that right-that is, the Art.
III. does not render invalid the law under which the committee
claim authority to make and enforce that rule, nor the rule itself,
as we have already shown.
. It remains now to be considered whether -the bill can be maintained on the other ground, namely: the prerogative of parents
to control their children as scholars, as against the prerogative of
the committee to make and enforce tie rule in question. This
does not involve any right or question of conscience under the
.constitution, but only the matter of legal right under the statutes
as to public schools. In this case it is not a question of discipline
or punishment of the scholar, as it was in Lander v. Seaver, 82
Verm. 144, or as it was involved in the case of Morrow v. Wood,
(Iowa) Law Reg. November 1874, p. 692. By our statutes the committee are charged with the duty of ",adopting all requisiteimeasures," &c., as before recited. The graded school in Brattleboro'
is organized and acts in pursuance of the statutes in that behalf. The committee are chosen and charged with their duties
under the same statutes. They adopted rules for the regulation of
the schools, and for the improvement of the scholars in learning.
The rule in question is for the purpose of inducing and enforcing
constancy in attendance. That such constancy is essential to such
improvement is not debatable. That such attendance is requisite,
as matter of regulation, in order to the necessary classification
of the scholars in reference to age,, capacity, studies and proficiency, is not debatable. Those who attend constantly cannot be
required to linger, in order that thei inconstant may keep along
with them ; nor can such inconstant scholars keep equal pace with
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those who attend constantly, The rule, then, is such as is contemplated by the statute, so far as the purpose of it is concerned.
That purpose is indispensable to the attainment of the object and
end proposed by the statutes, both as to the individual scholar,
and as to all others who may be affected by his attendance and•
absence. The answer states, as before recited, that the rule bad
been in operation for more than ten years. The children of the
orators were subjected to its operation in the present instance.
Was that unlawful ?
If the orators had the right to control the attendance of their
children as against that rule, then the committee had not the right
to maintain and enforce such rule. We are not prepared to sanction a view of the subject that would subordinate the authority of
the committee, in the matter of the attendance of registered
scholars, to the will of parents. On the other hand, we do not
hesitate to hold and declare as matter of law, that, in this respect,
the citizen is in subordination to the lawful rules for the regulation
of schools and the improvement of scholars in learning; and this
is for the same fundamental reason that he is in subordination to
the statutes themselves, on that, or any other subject; and it is no
more his right to defy or disregard those rules, than it is to defy
and disregard any ctatute that affects him as a citizen in respect
to schools, or any other subject involving the common weal, as it
is to be provided for under the constitution by the legislation of
the state. The occasion does iiot require a repetition of the trite
maxims as to the surrender of natural rights as a condition of
citizenship under the government, and is answered by the remark,
that if the citizen, either on the score of conscience, or of parental
prerogative, or in aity other respect, finds himself unduly curbed
and restricted in what he regards his personal rights, natural or
otherwise, by the constitution and the constitutional laws of the
state, there is available to him the beneficent declaration of Art.

XIX.
It suffices to recur to some of the leading cases that have been
before the courts, some of them involving the prerogative of teachers
and committees immediately over scholars, where parents have not
interposed ; some of them involving that prerogative in respect to
scholars where, as in this case, parents have interposed. Of the
former kind is Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Verm. 224, where, by the
concurrence of committee and teacher, the plaintiff was virtually
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excluded from the school, because he would not comply -with the
requirement upon all scholars in grammar, to write compositions.
In that case there was no prescribed penalty constituting a part of
the rule of requirement, but the penalty was extemporized to meet
the exigency. The prerogative of the committee and teacher,
both as to requirement and penalty, was maintained. In Landers
. eaver, 32 Verm. 114, the plaintiff, a boy some eleven years
9 1d, some hour and a half after the school had closed for the day,
and when he was at his home, and engaged in his father's service,
used saucy and disrespectful language to the teacher, the defendant,
in the presence of some of his fellow pupils. For this the defendant whipped him on his going to school the next morning. The
court held the following language: " But where the offence has a
direct tendency to injure the school and bring the master's authority into contempt, as in this case, when done in the presence
of other scholars and of the master, and with the design to insult
him, we think he has a right to punish the, scholar if he comes
ptgain to school."
Such was the judgment of the court in full
bench, upon full argument and careful consideration, and no doubt
is now entertained by this court of its soundness and propriety.
" In that case there was no prescribed rule, either as to conduct
.pr penalty. But it involved directly the prerogative of the teacher,
Fs against the exclusive authority of the parent over his child, in
reference to that child's conduct as affecting the .school of which
e was r; scholar.
uIn rerman v. Charlestown, 8 Cushing 160, the plaintiff was
expelled from school on account of licentious and immoral character,
though not manifested by any acts within the school. The action
was founded on a statute of Massachusetts, entitling a party to
recover damiage for being unlawfully excluded from public school
instruction. In that case there: was no prescribedrule on the subject, either of requirement or penalty.. Ch. J. SHAW, in the course
of an opinion which would be instructive and salutary to all to
read and ponder, says: "It seems to be admitted, if not it could
.hardly be questioned, that for misconduct in school, for disobedience to its reasonable regulations, a pupil may be excluded.
Why so ? There is no express provision in the law (as it then
-was) authorizing such exclusion; it results by necessary implication from the provisions of law requiring good discipline. It
proves that the right to attend is not absolute, but one to be en-

FERRITER

ET AL.

v. TYLER

ET AL.

joyed by all on reasonable conditions." Again, "but the court
are of opinion * * * that a power is vested in the general school
committee, or the master with their approbation and direction, to
exclude a pupil * * * for good and sufficient cause :" Steplhenson
v. Hall et al., 14 Barb. 222, was an action against the defendants
for expelling, as trustees, the daughter of the plaintiff from a publie school. She had been excluded by the teacher, for alleged
mfisconduct, with the concurrence of the defendants. On appeal
to the superintendent, she was to be permitted to return to the
school on certain conditions of promise as to future conduct, with
a confession that she had done wrong. She refused to comply
with the conditions. ALLEN, J., in the course of the opinion,
says : ,"it is undoubtedly true that trustees have the power, and
it is their duty, to dismiss, or exclude a pupil from, their school,
when, in their judgment, it is necessary for the good order and
proper government of the school so to do."
We have carefully studied the Iowa case of Mlorrow v. W1rood,
before cited, and not only find nothing in conflict with the other
cases decided, but that the ideas expressed by Judge COLE are in
harmony with the other cases. In that case the teacher required
a boy to study geography. His father, for good reasons, wanted
him to devote himself to other studies, requiring all his time and
strength, without geography. The boy, in obedience to his father's
direction, refused to study geography, and the teacher whipped
him. Hence the suit. It appears that geography was one of the
studies required by law to be taught ; but there was no law requiring any scholar, or particular description of scholars, to study it.
There was no rule of the school, besides the arbitrary requirement
of the teacher, which would make it the duty of the boy to pursue
that study.
Judge COLE says: " The statute gives the school board power
to make all needful rules and regulations for the organization,
gradation and government of the school, and power to suspend any
pupil from the privileges of the school for non-compliance with
the rules established by them, or by the teacher with their consent." It does not appear, nor is it inferable, that the school
board had made a rule requiring the boy to study geography, or
had given their consent to the requirement of the teacher.
The question then was, whether the teacher had justifiable cause
for wbipping the boy. The court held, that she had not, and in the
VOL. XXIV.-74
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discussion, held that, on the facts in the case, the father had the
right to direct as to the study of geography by his son. We see
no occasion for differing with the court in that case: In the
course of the opinion it is said, "it is not proposed to throw any
obstacle in the way of the performance of their duties" by the
school board. Again, "Cwe do not propose to lay down any rule
which will interfere with ariy reasonable regulation adopted for the
management and government of the public schools, or -which will
operate against their efficiency and usefulness. Certain studies
are required to be taught in the public schools by statute. The
rights of one pupil must be so exercised undoubtedly as not to
prejudice the equal rights of others. But the parent has the right
to make a reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for his
child to pursue, and this cannot possibly conflict with the equal
rights of other pupils. In the present case the parent did not
insist that his child should take any study outside of the prescribed
course." "And how it can result disastrously to the proper discipline, efficiency and well-being of the common schools to concede
the'paramount right to make a reasonable choice from the studies
in the prescribed course which his child shall pursue, is a proposition we cannot understand." And this, as well as all that was
said by the judge, is to be taken as said in a case where there was
no rule as to the study of geography by the boy, except the perHow this
sonal arbitrary command upon him of the teacher.
court -would decide in a'case involving the question of superiority
of authority between the parent and the school board, as to the
pursuit of a study required by the established rule of the board, we
have now no occasion to announce or intimate. Nor had that
court any such question before it.
In this connection it is interesting to refer to the case of Spiller
v. Woburn, 12 Allen 127, in which a girl, by direction of her
father, refused to bow her head during prayer at the opening of
the school, and where the father refused to request that she might
not be required to, the rule on that subject providing that scholars
would not be required to, whose parents should request that they
might not be so required. Ch. J. BIGELOw delivered the opinion
of the court, which held that it was lawful for the committee to
expel her from the school for suck disobedience to the rule. And
further in the same connection, the case of Spear v. Cummrngs,
23 Pick. 224, is worthy of attention, in which Oh. 3. SHAw says,
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"The law provides that every town shall choose a-school committee,
who shall have the general charge and superintendence of all the
public schools in such towns ;" that "this includes the power of
determining what pupils shall be received and what pupils rejected.
The committee may, for good cause, determine that some shall not
be received, as, for instance, if infected with any contagious disease,
or if the pupil or parents shall refuse to comply with regulations
necessary to the discipline and good management of the school."
These cases show the judicial views that have been held on the
subject under consideration, and suffice for the present.
Recurring now to what is stated in the answer, as to the manner
in which the rule has been administered, it is proper to remark,
that the lawfulness and propriety of the rule are not to be tested
or adjudged, upon the presumption that the penal part of it will
be unjustly or unwarrantably enforced. The presumption is the
other way, viz. : that it will be administered justly, and upon, and
with reference to, warrantable occasion. If a case should arise in
which it should appear that the penalty had been inflicted outside
of, or beyond the fair scope and reason of the rule, it would be
both the province and the duty of the courts to accord proper
remedy. But, as before demonstrated, this is not such a case;
and this leads to the further remark, that the remedy is not sought
in this case as against the refusal of leave to be absent on the 4th
of June; but as against the imposing, as the condition of remitting
the penalty, a promise that absence for a similar cause should not
be repeated that term. Such promise being refused, the penalty
or exclusion was not remitted, and the children did not return to
the schools. And hence the position assumed by the orators-the
same as already stated-that the committee had not the lawful
right to exclude scholars who should be absent by the direction of
their parents, contrary to the established rule of the school.
As before intimated, this position takes no account of any difference of occasion or reason for such direction of parents, whether
it be religious service, or secular employment, or amusement, but
is on the ground only of the right of the parent as against the rule
of the school. In reference to that position, in explicit statement,
as the result of the discussion, it is held, that scholars of a school
are amenable to the school. authorities as to their conduct as
scholars affecting the school, notwithstanding the prerogative of
their parents in respect to them.
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This, however, does not imply that committees or teachers are
the ultimate judges whether their measures, either by prescribed
rule, or extemporized, expedient or impulsive act, are lawfully
requisite or proper in a given case. The statute, in imposing the
duty of adopting all requisite measures, &c., does not confer ultimate jurisdiction on committees of the question whether a particular
measure is requisite or not, within the sense and intent of the
statute. When such question of lawfulness under the statute is
made between a party, against whom the measure operates, and
the committee or teacher, that questionis open before the courts
for consideration and decision, in view of !all thpt appertains to the
subject of it. The rule in question in this case, and the enforcement of it, are subject to the judgment of the courts as between
the parties to the suit. It is easy to suppose cases in which such
enforcement would be beyond the lawful right of the committee.
The rule itself, in terms and intent, contemplates exclusion as a
penalty only where permission to be absent is withheld for want of
reasonable cause shown. In case of casual sickness of the scholar
-of sickness or death in the family of the scholar-of some impediment, like fire or flood-in case of various incidents of current life,
giving occasion for temporary absence, the enforcement. of the
penalty of exclusion would, under circumstances, be adjudged to
be unauthorized inder the statutes and law by which the subject
isgoverned.
It is not intended by this to be held that there may not be
cases in which the decision and action of the committee or teacher
would not be deemed judicial and final. That subject has been
involved in many of the decided cases, under peculiar statutes,
especially in Maine and Massachusetts. We have no occasion to
pronounce upon it further in this case.
Upon the facts shown, we are unable to find any warrant of law
for maintaining the bill.
The decree dismissing it is affirmed.
The following seem to be the leading
facts upon which the case rests :- .
1. There is a distinct refusal of the
teachers to allow -the Catholic children
to absent themselves from the school, in
order to attend the service of their
church on holy days, and a persistent
claim to demand the contrary, upon

penalty of continued exclusion from
school.
2. This is confirmed by the cammittee, and what is said about the short
or imperfect notice is clearly waived by
persisting in the claim.
3. There can be no doubt the 4th of
June was a high festival in the Roman
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church, and that the teachers knew the
day before that this church so regarded
it, and desired their children to attend
the services.
4. There call
be no question both the
parents and the priest desired, and requircd, the children to attend service in
church on that day, and that this was
sufficiently made known both to the
teachers and the committee.
5. There can be no question also
that, with all this knowledge, both
teachers and committee concurred in
refusing permission.
6. It seems equally clear that they
also concurred in refusing such children
as attended the service, permission to
return to tile
school, except upon their
assurance that it would not be repeated,
titus clearly treating them as being in
tile
wrong for attending such service,
and that they might rightfully be punished for the same.
These facts being established, two
questions seem fairly involved in the
case. (1.) Whether in case of conflict
the conductors of tie school may lawfully
insist upon their rules and regulations,
setting aside those of the church where
the children receive religious education ;
in other words, how far school education
may interfere with or supersede religious education
(2.) How far the
school laws or regulations will control
the right of the parents to direct the
attendance of their children upon religious services, and expose the children
to punishment for obeying their parents
in this respect ?
The answer to these questions will
depend upon the laws of the state. The
provision of the Constitution will, of
course, override all legislation upon the
subject in conflict with such provision.
The clause bearing directly upon this
point, as stated in the opinion, is:
"That no authority can or ought to be
vetel in, or assumed by anyj powr whatfrer, that shall in any case interfere with,

or in any manner control the rights of
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conscience in thefree (xercise of religious
tcor..hp." We have emphasized these
words because they seem to us peculiarly
expressive of a settled determination
in those who ordained them, as the perpetual basis of religious freedom in
the state, to leave no ground for misunderstanding or evasion.
If these
words do not place the rights of conscience in regard to freedom" of religious worship, above legislative control,
then it seems to us difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of any which
would have that effect. And the history
of these provisions in the other
American state constitutions, and the
motives which induced them, as fully
set forth in the opinion, would not allow
us to suppose the framers of these constitutional provisions meant anything
less than their words import.
And when we come to look into the
laws of this state in regard to schools,
we find no provisions calculated to
justify the exercise of any such interference with religious worship as was
here attempted. Every town is required to maintain "one
or more
schools for the instruction of the young,
in orthography, reading, writing, English grammar, geography, arithmetic,
history, and Constitution of the United
States, and good behavior."
We
should be somewhat at a loss to conjecture upon -what ground any governor
of the schools, under these provisions,
could assert any such stringent discipline as was attempted in this case. It
is pretty certain that compelling the
children to disobey their parents, or
punishing them for refusing to do so,
would not, ordinarily, be regarded as
the natural mode of teaching "good
behavior" to them, or it surely would
not have been so regarded when that
provision in the statute was first ineorporated into the school laws of the
state
And we cannot suppose any
one would believe any such stringency
of discipline indispensable for the sue-

59O

FERRITER

ET AL.

cessful teaching of any or all the
branches of study required by the
statute. But if we may suppose that
to have been the fact in this case, it
will not conclude the rights of those
who compose the school, since no
school regulations can possess authority
superior to the statute, and no .statute
of that character could override an express constitutional protision to the contrary. We must conclude, therefore,
that the defendants were not justified in
what they did, because the Constitution
of the state guarantees entire immunity
from all interference with religious
worship to all its inbabitants.
It scarcely seems necessary to allude
to the suggestion, whether there can be
any question of conscience involved in
celebrating "Corpus Christi" in the
Roman church. It is confessedly one of
its high festivals, and has been so for
hundreds of years. But there seems to
have been some idea thrown out, that
it might be celebrated at an hour not
.interfering with the schools. But this
suggestion probably proceeds from want
of knowledge of the requirements of
that church.. Such a festival can only
be properly celebrated, by high mass,
where the church have the musical appliances for such masses, and this must
be celebrated before 12 o'clock, noon,
and must therefore begin as early as 9
o'clock, A. x. ; and all will feel the absurdity of requiring it to begin at 6 A.
x., in order to finish before school
hours This is, in fact, never done in
that church, if it be allowable even,
which we question. At all events, if
the rights of worship are made by the
organic law of the state, superior to
legislative control even, it would seem
little less than absurd to have rules of
school attendance attempt to overrule
the canons of the church, which have
been observed for hundreds of years.
Any such untimely celebration of the
day would not be, to the devout worshipper, a celebration at all. And who
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would wish to train up his children in
so irregular n manner I We think this
matter is not fully comprehended by
most of the Protestants. They have
no daily service and no great festivals.
Their week-day meetings are held
mostly in the evenings, and it does not
occur to them why the Catholic church
may not do the same. But that church
is bound to have daily morning service
throughout the year, and on festivals,
high ;nass, and all before 12 o'clock
noon. So that it will require them to
begin at midnight, as it were, certainly
at a'very inconvenient hour, at some
seasons of the year in this high latitude,
in order to finish before school hours.
And then, the children would be in no
condition to perform their school duties
after so protracted a service in church.
It is evident that those who argue for
such an accommodation must do it under
some misapprehension of the facts.
And what is said about these parents
or pr1ests, not considering the day too
holy for their children to play in the
streets in the afternoon, must equally
proceed from similar misapprehensioh.
That church never considers it any departure from the strictest observance of
its fesiivals to recreate in the afternoon.
Even their fasts are not observed so
much by long-facedness as by bond fide
.abstincnce and self-denial. No branch
of the Catholic church ever regarded
Sunday any more sacred than its other
festivals, but less so than many others;
that is wholly a Protestant idea and
mainly Puritan.
Possibly Protestants would comprehend this question more fully, if we
supposed the laws of the state to require
the scholars in the common schools to
attend some moral or philosophic lecture, in some grand hall, on Sunday
morning from 9 o'clock to 12 o'clock.
And there is nothing to hinder the
legislature doing this, except this same
Art. III., guartntying freedom of religious worship, whicl does indeed also
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declare that every denomination of
Christians ought to keep up " somesort
of religious worship" on the Lord's day.
But every other legal provision for rendering that day more snred than any
day, consists in mere statutory provi-

sions, which may be repealed any day,
and then nothing would be less improbable than to require all the common
school children to hold a kind of musical or other artistic service, devoted to
the gods of the day, as has bcen done
before in olher states or countries ; and
how could any one say, such a service
would not be "some kind of religious
worship" within the Constitution ? We
do not doubt some of the descendants
of the Puritans would he able to comprehend that this would be an essential
abridgment " of tleriglts of con.kciencc
icc inefrec exercise of relqious worship."
They would feel it more because it interfered with their worship on Sunday.
But there can be no question, the
Roman church, or the English church
and its American branch, conscientiously regard some of its festivals,
filling on week-days, far more sacred
than an ordinary Sunlay, and so
equally of the services. We need not
specify beyond Christmas and Holy
Thursday or Ascension clay, as to the
English church. And from what we
have seen of the mode of celebrating
" Corpus Christi," on the continent of
Europe, we make no question that is
one of their greatest clays. The same
may be said of the Feast of the Purification, or Candlemas, which is celebrated
in St. Peter's, Rome, in a style of magnificent display infinitely beyond that
of an ordinary Sunday. It is only
Easter (lay that is properly called the
Lord's day in the Catholic church as the
anniversary of the resurrection. The
olier Sundays in the year are called so
by courtesy. The undeniable fact that
we Protestants have become a kind of
Sunday Christians, renders itdifficult for
us to comprehend what burdens we are
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really laying upon churchmen, when we
require their children to absent themselves from church and actually attend
school upon the most sacred fasts and
festivals of their church. We believe
nothing more is required to induce justice in regard to these matters, than a
fuller comprehension of the real facts
in these cases. It is only very recently
that the courts and the schools hnve discontinued their sessions on Christmas
and Good Friday. And even now some
of the courts require to be informed,
that in holding sessions on Good Friday
they are but giving countenance to the
precedent of Pontius Pilate.
There can be no doubt in this case the
children were required to disobey their
parents, and were punished for not
doing so. They might as well have
been subjected to corporal punishment
as to exclusion from school. Then tile
case would have been precisely parallel
with that of Morrow v. Wood, 13 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 692, and the able and
judicious opinion of Mr. Justice COLE
would fully apply to this case. Since
the common schools have been compelled, by the contrariety of opinion
upon religious subjects in the country,
to virtually abandon all instruction
upon the subject, it must not be expected that it can be also tolerated in a
Christian country, that they should be
allowed to teach positive irreligion, or
what directly conflicts with Christian
teaching upon morals. The first great
command of the Decalogue, aq to our
duty to each other, is, " IHonor thy
filther and thy mother." There could
then be nothing more in conflict with
Christian teaching than to require the
children to disobey their parents. It is
creditable, we think, to the Roman
church that their children were too well
taught in their primary duty to their
parents to obey the school, when it
came to a conflict between the school
and their parents.
It is greatly to be feared that we are
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nil quite too indifferent to the general
effect of so magnifying the authority
and wisdom of the common schools in
the eyes of the children, above their
parents, in all matters even remotely
pertaining to education, and at the same
time teaching the children that mere
text-book knowledge is superior to
all other attainments. There can be
little doubt, this may have contributed
more than we comprehend to that general disregard and disrespect among
the young toward their elders, which is
so much deplored by many.- But when
it comes to the matter of religious
teaching, which is so exclusively under
the control of the parents, and by the
very organic law of the state made
sacred above all other rights, it might
be supposed no one could fail to comprehend the unreasonableness of the
claim here made. What is said in the
Constitution of the state about the duty
of maintaining schools, and the consequent necessity of their claims being
vindicated by the courts, is all very well.
But it must be remembered'that the
provisions in the Constitution aboqt

schools are subordinate to those securing
freedom of religious worship. And if
we make the case under' consideration
our own, we shall all be able to comprehend that the demands of the school
authority here were most unreasonable
and without .either law or necessity.
We think it unfortunate,* both for the
interests of the schools and the quiet
and good order of the country, that any
class of Christians should have been
subjected to such bard measures in defining religious freedom, the thing
above all others of which we boast the
loudest. It seems to us far wiser to
mete out to all the most liberal measures upon this subject, especially where,
as in the present case, it must be conceded by all that they offer a very
plausible, if not, as we think, an invincible legal vindication of their claim.
By so doing we shall be able to secure
the support of the clearest popular conviction in support of the decisions of the
courts, in refusing all countenance towards clearly unreasonable and illegal
demands of that character.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of .New .Brunswick.
EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN RAILWAY COMPANY v.
GEORGE McLEOD.
The plaintiff company was about being organiled, and defendant was asked to
iake stock in it, and subscribed his name to a paper prepared for that purpose,
agreeing to take ten shares. Held, that this was an offer made by the company
on the one side, and accepted by the defendant on the other, and that a complete
contract was formed, which made him liable as alstockholder to assessments.
Held, also, that it was not necessary that certain shares designated by numbers
should be assigned to defendant, to make him liable.

THIs was an action of debt to recover a balance alleged to be
due from the defendant as a subscriber for stock in the European
and North American Railway Company.
It appeared at the trial that a meeting to organize the plaintiff
company under the Act of Incorporation was held on the 30th
May 1864, 'when directors 'were chosen, a secretary and treasurer
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appointed, and by-laws passed defining the duties of the president and secretary, the mode of calling special meetings, the form
of certificates of shares and the manner in which they were to be
signed, &c. A committee was also appointed to obtain subscribers
for stock. The persons who agreed to take stock in the company
subscribed their names on a sheet of paper, called " The Stock
Subscription List," which had the following beading:"The European and North American Railway Company for
extension from St. John, westward.
"We, the following persons, whose names are subscribed hereto,
do hereby agree to take, and do take, the number of shares in the
capital stock of the aforesaid company set opposite to our respective names, subject to the aforesaid Act of Assembly incorporating
said company, and the aforesaid by-laws of the said company and
the laws of this province."
Shares, $50 each.
Among a large number of subscribers in this list, the defendant's
name appeared as a subscriber for ten shares-his name, occupation, and the number of shares, all being in his own handwriting.
Evidence was given that assessments had been made and failure
to pay.
by defendant
ALLEN, J., after stating the pleadings and facts in the case,
continued :-The first question is, whether the defendant was a
stockholder in the company ? I think there is a clear distinction
between this case and the English cases that have been referred to.
There is nothing in the act incorporating this company, or in any
of our acts relating to corporations generally, defining what shall
constitute a stockholder. Both the act of incorporation, and the
Act 32 Vict. c. 54, speak of "subscribers" for stock, and of the
stock being "subscribed for ;" and many other acts of incorporation use similar expressions, tending to show, it seems to me, that
when a company is about being organized, and persons are asked
to take stock in it, and subscribe their names to a paper prepared
for that purpose, agreeing to take a certain number of shares, if
the company is organized under its charter, the persons so subscribing their names become liable as stockholders in the company.
It is an offer made by the company on one side, and accepted by
the person so subscribing his name, on the other, and therefore
becomes a complete contract. ' This, in my opinion, constitutes the
VoL. XXIV.-75
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distinction between this case and Pellatt'8 Case, Law Rep. 2 Ch-.
527; Gunn's Case, Law Rep. 8 Ch. 40, and a number of other
English cases, decided under the Winding-up Act. In each case,
the question is, whether there is a contract. Lord CAIRNS says
in .Pellatt's Oase: "I think that where an individual applies for
shares in a company, there being no obligation to let him have
any, there must be a response by the company, otherwise there is
no contract. * * * I cannot, therefore, consider an application
for shares, followed by a registration, not communicated to Mr.
Pelldtt, trcbnstitut6'a complete tfansactiou." But where, as in
the present case, the authorized agents of a company apply to an
individual tind request him to take shares in the company, and he
hssents, and sduscribes his name to the stock-list, stating the numlybr
of share he agrees:to take, wha't 'more is needed to complete -he
transaction? Had the defendant in this-case applied to the company for shares, then I admit there would have been no contract until
they asseted, and" oinmunica{ed their assentfto him; but that is
not the stat6 of facts here. It is-also contended that the shares
should have been numbered, ajid that the defendailt was not a
ttockholder until the edmpany -assigned :ten slfre 'to him, distinguished by certain numbers. But where is the obligation 'to
-number theln? The act of incorporation does nqt require it.. It
Is true, the by-laws of the company contemplate ihat certificftes
of:stock should be.issued to the stockholders, and the-form of. cer'
tificate shows ihat it ';vs ifitended. that the shares should be distinguished by numbers; but'ould
the omi§ ion of. the company
to issue a certificate, or to describe. in itte'numiibers of the shares,
br to misdescribe the numbeis deprive a st6ckhoder of'his shares?
i think "iiot. The certificate does not ,constitute the contract
between the company andthe Ehareholder, thou'gh it may be eviIence of it against the :
.~I!t
as also contended that
iinless the shares were numibered, they could. not be seized undei
V.n execution, as -provided by 1 Rev. Stats., cap. 119. But I do
iot asseaitto that proposition. I see no difficulty under that act in
sgizing shares in a company,'though they are not distinguished by
iny particuau nbers. The act says; that "The shares of stock
bf every sto6kholder in every incorporated joint-stock company,
hliall be personal estate and'liable tabe seized and sold as such.
.The officeri e±deuting the, excution shall leave a certified copy
heeof with the clerk,- 9ecetgiy oi dhie of the corporation,
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-who shall give the sheriff a"certificate of the number of shares
held by such execution-debtor; and the shares therein so liable
shall be deemed seized when such copy is left, and shall be sold,
&c. ; and on .producing a bill of sale from the sheriff, the officer
of the corporation, whose duty it is to register the transfer of
shares, shall transfer to the purchaser the shares so sold." Now,
what more is necessary than that the officer of the company should
give the sheriff a certificate stating how many shares the debtor
owns? And if they have never been numbered, or, if numbered,
the officer does not state the numbers in his certificate, but merely
states (what the act requires of him) that the debtor holds five or
ten shares, as the case may be, will that prevent the sheriff from
selling those five or ten shares, and the purchaser from being
registered as the owner of them in place of the original holder?
If the shares were of different values, then I could understand the
necessity of numbering them, to distinguish one class from the
other; but where all are of equal value it would seem to be imma.terial whether they were numbered or not-the sheriff could sell
the whole, or a certain number of the shares, and no confusion
could arise for want of their being numbered. The cases of The
_Newry
Enniskillen, Railway Co. v. Edmonds, 2 Exch. 118;
The Wohverhampton Waterworks Co. v. ffawksford, 7 C. B. N.
S. 795, and The Irish Peat Co. v. Phillips, 1 B. & S. 629, have
been relied on by the defendant's counsel; but two of these cases
turned upon the particular words of" The Companies Clauses Consolidation Act," which declares in sect. 8, that every person who
had subscribed the prescribed sum to the capital of the company;
and whose name had been entered on the register of shareholders.
should be deemed a shareholder of the company; and in sect. 9,
-that the company should keep a book to be called "The Register
'of Shareholders,"-in which should be entered the names and addi,tions of the-.pers6hs'entitled to shares in the company, together
with the nfiiber of shares to which such shareholder should be
entitldd, distinguishing each share by its number, and that the
book should be authenticated by the seal of the company affixed
thereto. In actions for calls in the first two of these cases, it was
held, that to constitute a person a holder of shares, the company
was bound to prove that his name was on the register. It is true,
that'ERLE, 0. J., in delivering judgment in The Wolverhampton
Waterworks Co. v. fawksford, says, "No shares had been num.
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bered, and no specific shares had been appropriated;" but the real
ground of the decision was, that the defendant's name was not on
any register of. shareholders, such as the company was required
by the act to keep; this appears by the judgment of the Exchequer
Chamber in The Irish Peat Co. v. Phillips, where it is said that
The Tolverhampton TFaterworks Co. v. fawksford was no authority for the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench; which
was, that shares were not created so as to make the alleged owner
liable for calls thereon until the shares were specifically numbered
and appropriated by number. In the case of Te Irish Peat Co. v.
Phillips, the charter of the company required that all proprietors
of stock should execute a deed of settlement, whereby the capital
should be divided into a certain number of shares, to be numbered
in regular succession, beginning with No. 1. A deed of settlement
was prepared containing these provisionis (substantially the same
as "The Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act)," but the defendant did not execute it; and on.that ground it was held that he
was not a shareholder, nor liable for calls. Neither of these cases,
then, seems to meto support the position taken, that the defendant
in this case is not liable because no shares were numbered by the
company, and, as such, allotted to him; and I am unable to come
-to the conclusion, that a numbering of the shares was essential to
*constitute him a stockholder. But in addition to this, the act of
incorporation says, that if "any 8ubscriber, or stockholder," shall
neglect to pay any assessment on his shares, the directors may
order such shares to be sold, and if there is any deficiency, "such
delinquent 8u6scriber or stockholder shall be held accountable," &c.
The Act 82 Yict., c. 55, uses the terms, "subscribers for shares,"
and "subscribers to the capital stock ;" and the third section
authorizes the company to sue for, recover and receive "1from any
subscriber the amount due for unpaid subscribed stock which may
have been subscribed for by such subscriber." Surely it cannot be
disputed that the defendant was a subscriber for stock in this company, even if any doubt could exist about his being a stockholder.
In the report of the case of The Tolverhampton Waterworks Co.
.v. Rawksford, in 6 C. B. N. S. 386, on Aemurrer to the declaration, the judgment for the defendant was put expressly on the
ground that.the statute gave the remedy for calls against "1shareholders" only, and not against "subscribers" simply; and the
declaration.did not allege that the defendant was a "stockholder."
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But by the act under consideration the power to sue is not confined
to stockholders, but is expressly given against subscribers; and
therefore whether the words " subscriber" and "stockholder" were
used indiscriminately in the act, and us pointing to the same set
of persons, as was said in The TVest London Railway Co. v. Bernard, 13 Law J. Q. B. 08, or otherwise, seems to me to be immaterial. As regards their liability to pay calls, I think there is no
*dstinction between a subscriber for stock and a stockholder. For
these reasons I think this objection ought not to prevail.
The next objection was, that the stock was subscribed subject
to the provisions of the act of incorporation and the by-laws of
the company ; that they formed conditions precedent to the defendant's liability, and that the company had not performed the conditions. These alleged conditions are to be found in the second
section of the act of incorporation, which declares that the capital
stock of the company shall consist of $2,000,000, to be divided
into forty thousand shares of $50 each ; and in the fifth section,
which authorizes the president, directors and company "to make
such equal assessments from time to time on all the shares in the
said corporation as they may deem necessary and expedient." The
objection is, that the first assessment made on the 16th July 1867,
was not an equal assessment on all the shares,because it expressly
excluded the $250,000 of stock subscribed in the United States.
If this objection is not cured by the Act 32 Vict., c.54, I think it
must prevail. * * * [The judge's description of the act is omitted
as not of general interest.]
On this ground, therefore, I think the first assessment was
illegal. But admitting the first assessment to be bad, on account
of the exclusion of the subscribers for stock in the United States,
will the inclusion of that assessment in the notice which was given
by the president of the company, under the Act 32 Vict., c. 54,
and the sale of the defendant's stock for the non-payment of that,
together with the nine subsequent assessments, vitiate the sale?
It seems to me that it will not do so. The objection of inequality
does not apply to any but the first assessment; and there isno
such connection between them as that one defective assessment
should destroy all the others. Each one stands on its own merits,
and, if legally made, gives a separate cause of action, though a
preceding one may be defective. For the payment of such as were

598

EUROPEAN & N. A. RAILWAY CO. v. MQLEO.L

legally made and notified, a shareholder would be liable-for the
others he would not. The defendant clearly was a defaulter for
non-payment of nine assessments, and for such default the company had a right to sell his shares, and I cannot think that where
they had such right, and where there clearly was.a balance (without
including the first assessment), for which the defendant was liable
in an iaction, that the plaintiffs claiming against him in that action
a larger sum than they had a right to, is a:ground for setting aside
the verdict; it oply affects the amount to be recovered. The plaintiff, in an action of this nature, may prove and recover less than
the sum stated to be due in his declaration: 1 Chit. Pl. 114; and
"if the plaintiff states as a cause of action more than is necessary
for the gist of the action, the jury may find so much proved, and
so much not proved, and the court would be bound to pronounce
judgment for the plaintiff upon that verdict, provided the facts
proved constituted a good cause of action :" per HOLROYD, J., in

Bromfield v. Jones, 4 B. & C. 385. Now, in my opinion, the
facts proved in this case constituted a good cause of action, as to
all except what was claimed on account of the first call, and the
jury had a right to find all except that proved. Instead, therefore, of the defendant being liable for the assessments on the full
amount of his ubscribed stock, he is only liable for the deficiency
rmaining on the nine assessments, after deducting the amount
realized from the sale of his shares, with interest and expenses.
My brother WELDON has stated that, in his opinion, the notice
given by the president, under the Act 32 Vict., c. 55, is insufficient.
No objection to the form of the notice was taken at the trial, or"
on the argument; and though probably it might have been more
artificially drawn, I am inclined to think it contains substantially,
all that the act requires.
For these reasons, I think the rule should be discharged, and
that the verdict should be reduced by the amount of the first
assessment,. unless the agreement entered into at the trial precludes
such a mode of dealing with the case.
RITCH E, C. J., concurred.

WELDON, J., dissented.

WEST

ET AL.

v. CITIZENS' INS. CO.

Supreme Court Commission of Ohio.
GEORGE If. WEST

ET AL.

v. CITIZENS' INSURANCE COMPANY.

Policies of insurance, like other contracts, are to receive a reasonable construction, so as not to defeat the intention of the parties.
A policy of insurance, issued to a mercantile partnership on a stock of goods
owned by the firm, and with which they are carrying on business, which contains
-no provisions limiting or restricting alienation of the property, is not avoided by
a sale by one partner to his copartners, who continue the partnership business, of
his interest in the stock of goods.
When the policy contains a provision that the assignment of the same, or any
interest therein, without the assent of the company endorsed thereon, avoids it,
such a sale, and the assignment by the retiring partner to his copartners, who continue the business, of his interest in the policy, does not avoid it.
In case of loss after such sale and transfer, the remaining partners, being the
real parties in interest, should sue on the policy, and in such action they are not
limited in the amount of recovery to their interest in the partnership goods before
recover for the whole loss.
such sale and transfer, but cana

ERROR reserved in the District Court of Hamilton county.
-oadly, Johnson & Colston, for plaintiffs in error.-The only
question in this case is, whether a prohibition, contained in a policy
of insurance. issued to partners, against the assignment of "any

interest therein," refers to transfers inter sese.
Three theories might be, and have been, espoused, viz. : First,
that of our learned antagonists, that if one partner retire from a
firm all its policies of insurance containing the quoted clause, or
a similar provision forbidding alienation of the insured premises,
are at once forfeited, and unless by consent of the underwriter;
cease and determine ; secondly, that such alienation has the effect

of forfeiture only to the extent of the retiring partner's undivided
interest; 'and, thirdly, wbhat we respectfully submit to be the better
opinion, viz., that the purpose. of such provision is not to forbid
changes of interest aiin'j the parthiers themselves," but relates exclusively to assignments and alienations to third persons:
. The second theory is maintained in the single case of Hobbs v.

The Memphis Ins. Co., 1 Sneed 444. Most of the cases which are
relied on against us are founded on and follow the dictum of Judge

CADY in the case of Murdock v. The Chenango County Mutual
Ins. Co., 2 Comst. 210, which was overruled in Roffman & Place
V.

The .Etna Fire Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 405.

In -the cases of

391, and Th
'Gosoeiwr v. The Atlantic-Fire In&.Co., 17 -N.Y.
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Buffalo Steam Engine Works v. The Sun l3lutual Inhs. Co., 17
Id. 401, cases which have been followed by the courts of every
state whose attention has been called to the subject since, it is held
that where a mortgagor insures, loss, if any, payable to his mortgagee, or where a mortgagor insures and assigns, with the consent
of the underwriter, to his mortgagee, a subsequent breach of the
conditions of the policy by the mortgagor avoids the policy. Why?
Because in both these cases, it is the mortgagor's interest which is
insured. The discussion in both these cases proceeds upon the
supposition that had it been the mortgagee's interest which was
insured, as it was in Eoster v. The Equitable Mutual Fire ins.
Co., by reason of his having given new premium-notes upon the
assignment to him, the act of the mortgagor would have had no
such effect. Although the decisions in 17 New York were followed
in Massachusetts, in Hail v. Mlechanics' Ins. Co., 6 Gray 185, and
Loring v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 8 Id. 169, yet the principle
decided in Foster v. The Equitable llutual Fire ins. Co., has
been since affirmed in the case of Lawrence v. The Holyoke ins.
Co., 11 Allen 387.
VIt follows from this, that an alienation other than by the "insured" does not avoid a policy. Ilence we may conclude that if a
firim be insured, the alienation by a partner of his individual interest, especially to his copartners, is not forbidden; but, on the
contrary, that the real purpose and intent of the parties in agreeing to the language used in the policy, is to prevent alienation to
third persons by the firm, which shall introduce strangers into the
proprietary interest and control, unless by consent ot the company:
32 N. Y. 412 ; Burnett & M1artin v. The E ufaula iTone Ins. Co.,
46 Ala. 11 ; Pierce v. Tie Xa~shua Fire ins. Co., 56 N. I. 297;
Angell on Ins., sect. 197. An insurance policy is to be most
strongly construed against the underwriter: May on Ins., sects.
174, 175.
Matthews, Ramsey . MTatthews, for defendant in error.-The
single question presented by the record is, whether the assignment
by one of the partners, to his copartners, of his interest in the
policy and property insured, before loss, defeats the recovery of
the plaintiffs. The affirmation of this proposition is sustained by
May on Insurance, sect. 280 ; -Doehrerv. .tna Ins. Co., 18 Mo.
128; Flanders on Insurance 428. And see Hoffman v. ztna
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Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 405, where the history of the law on this question in the state of New York is given: Tillou v. Kingston .lfut.
Ins. Co., 7 Barb. 570; 5 N. Y. 404; Miurdock v. The Chenango
County A ut. IThs. Co., 2 Comst. 210; Tilson v. The Genesee
Mut. Ins. Co., 16 Barb. 511 ; Hobbs & Hurley v. Memphis Ins.
Co., 1 Sneed 444; Howard .Byckman v. The Albany I ns. Co.,
3 Denio 301 ; Tate v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 13 Gray 79 ; Wood
v. Rutland & Addison Hut. Ins. Co., 31 Verm. 552; Barnes v.
Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 51 Me. 110; ifoxsie v. Providence
Mut. FireIns. Co., 6 R. I. 517 ; Finley v. Lycoming Co. Mut. Ins..
Co., 30 Penna. St. 313; Buckley v. Garrett, 47 Id. 280; Baltimore Fire Ins. Co. v. McGowan, 16 Md. 47; -Dix v. M3ercantile
Ins. Co., 22 Ill. 277; Keeler v. _Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 16 Wis.
523; H~artford Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 23 Ind. 181;. Doehrer cj
Bumb v. .ztna Ins. Co., 18 Mo. 128.
JOHNSON, J.-The question in this case arises on a demurrer of
the defendant to the petition, alleging that said petition did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The plaintiffs sue as individuals, and not in the partnership
name, and claim to recover on a policy of insurance against fire,
on a stock of goods in Indianapolis, for one year, from April 17ts
1869 to April 17th 1870.
The original policy was issued April 17th 1866, for one year,
and was renewed each year thereafter, the last renewal being on
17th of April 1869. It was issued to the firm of H. F. West &
Co., composed of the plaintiffs and one Henry F. AVest, who, on
the 1st of December 1869, retired from the firm, and assigned all
his interest in iaid policy and stock of goods to his copartners,
the plaintiffs, who continued the business.
The stock of goods was consumed by fire, December 17th 1869.
Hence this action.
By the terms of the policy, the defendant contracted "to make
good to the insured, their executors, administrators or assigns, all
such immediate loss or damage as shall happen by fire to the said
property."
Upon the foregoing facts but one question is presented. That
is: Did the assignment by Henry F. West of his interest in the
.policy and stock of goods avoid the policy or prevent a recovery
VOL. XXIV.-76
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thereon-the assent of the company to such transfer not having
been given thereto ? This question must be determined by giving
a construction to the teris and conditions of the policy. In form
and language, it is an agreement between two parties, the insurer
and the insured, though executed only by the insurer.
The only clause relating to such a transfer is in the words following: " And it is further agreed * * * that if this policy,
or any interest therein, shall be assigned, unless, in either ease, the
assent thereto of saidcompany be endorsed hereon, these presents
shall thenceforth be null and void."
It will be observed that this policy (which is part of the record)
is a contract with a partnershiq), and not with the individuals composing it; that, as such partners, they owned the stock of goods,
and were doing business therewith in the usual way.
It is also important to note that the policy contains no provisions relating to alienation of the property, or prescribing any
mode of continuing the policy, in case of sale of the goods, by obtaining the assent of the company thereto. Such provisions are
to be found, we believe, in most insurance contracts.
The cladse above quoted relates only to the assignment of the
policy, or any interest therein, and is silent as to the alienation of
the property insured.
Ordinarily, this omission is unimportant, for it is well settled
that in such case, when the insured, by alienation or otherwise,
parts with all his insurable interest in the property insured, he cannot, in case of loss, recover, because, having no interest in the
property destroyed, he has sustained no damage. Neither can the
assignee of the policy, without the assent of the insurer, recover,
because he is a stranger to the contract, whom the company is not
bound to recognise.
In the examination of the numerous cases cited, this omission is
an important element, as very many of them turn on the words
limiting and restricting alienation. Thus, in Dix v. Hiercantile
Ins. Co., 22 11. 277, and The Hartford Ins. Co. v. Ross et al.,
23 Ind. 179, there was this clause, upon which the cases largely
turned: "And in case of any transfer or change of title in the property, or of any undivided interests therein, such insurance shall
be void and cease." They were cases much like the one before
us; and stress is laid by the.court on the words "undivided inter-
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ests," as correctly describing a partner's interest. So, also, in
many other case the peculiar wording of these clauses relating to
alienation enter largely into the discussion of the legal aspects of
the case, in the opinion of the courts deciding them.
As to such clauses, it is sufficient to say that, as a general rule,,
their only effect is to either enlarge or restrict the right, which
exists without them, to bring an action by the assured in case of
loss. If the assured still retains such an insurable interest in the
property, as that he sustains a loss by the fire, he cari, to the extent of that loss, recover; otherwise, if he has parted with all such
interest, for then no damage has resulted to him.
Great care should also be taken to distinguish between those
cases decided by an application of the common-law rules of Pleading and those which are made to depend solely on the rights of the
parties growing out of the terms of the contract itself. The former
depend on who are the proper parties to the action at common law,
the latter on the terms of the contract; and from these terms the
court must determine the existence, extent and character of the
obligations and liabilities of the parties to the contract. The one
is to be decided by the rules of pleading, the other by a construction of the stipulations of the policy.
Since the adoption of our code, under which the real party in
interest may. sue, whether the contract is joint or several, the
former class of decisions becomes unimportant. There can be no
doubt that if the common-law rules of pleading were in force in
Ohio, the plaintiffs could not recover-not because they had no
insurable interest, for they owned all the property covered by the
policy; nor because theysustained no damage, for that is admitted;
but solely for the reason that this was a joint contract by the
insured, and all must be joined as plaintiffs. By these rules, if
all were so joined, they still could not recover, because Henry V.
West, one of the joint contractors, had parted with all his insurable interest by a sale. In either case, the result would alike be
fatal to these plaintiffs, who have sustained all the loss against
which they were indemnified; and the rights of the parties, and
the liabilities of the insurers, arising from the terms of the policy,
would remain undetermined by the court.
In Murdock v. The Chenango Ins. Co., 2 Comst. 210, one
tenant in common sold his interest in the property insured to his
co-tenant. The action was in the name of both, though the com-
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pany had assented to the sale. It was held that the misjoinder
was fatal. On the other hand, Tate v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 13 Gray
(lass.) 79, was a case like the former, except that the action was
in the name of the co-tenant, who had become sole o, ncr by purchase. It was held that the non-joinder was alike fatal, Judge
BIGELOW saying: "Upon familiar pripciples, both the joint contractors should join in bringing the aclon, * * * and the omission
to join them is a good defence."
In both cases, the parties were sent out of court without their
rights adjudicated, by the application of the " familiar principles"
of common-law pleading.
Under the code, the real party in interest must sue. In this
case the suit is properly brought, but the right of recovery does
not depend on questions of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, but
upon the liability of the insurers growing out of the contract. Is
the defendant therefore liable to the plaintiffs by the terms of this
policy ? To determine this question, reference must be had to the
familiar rules of construction.
The policy should receive a reasonable interpretation. Its intent and substance should be ascertained from the language employed. Its stipulations should have full legal effect, to guard the
insurer against fraud and imposture. As it is a contract of indemnity to the insured, it should be liberally construed in his favor,
not only because this mode of construction is most conducive to
trade and business, but because it is probably most consonant with
the intentions of the parties. There is no more reason for a strict
compliance with its terms than ordinary contracts. There is nothing in such a contract intrinsically more sacred or inviolable than
a contract about any other subject : 25 Wend. 374. Exceptions
in a policy should be strictly construed, and when there are two
interpretations equally fair, that which gives the greater indemnity
should prevail : May on Insurance, sect. 174.
None of these rules is more fully established or more imperative
and controlling than that which declares that it must be liberally
construed in favor of the insured, so as not to defeat, without a
plain necessity, his claim to indemnity, which, in making his
insurance, it was his object to secure ; and when the words "without violence" are susceptible of two interpretations, that which
will sustain the elsdim and cover the loss must in preference be
adopted : May on Insurance, sect. 175.
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Guided by these principles, let us examine the terms, which, it
is claimed, avoid this policy.
The natural reading of these terms, "if this policy or any
interest therein be assigned," would seem to be completed by
adding after the word "assigned" the name of the contracting
party, so as to read, "if this policy or any interest therein be
assigned by said . .. West & Co." H. F. West & Co. alone
could make an assignment of the title to the policy.. Henry F.
West did not assign the policy or any interest in it which the firm
had. The partnership name must be used to transfer the policy
or any definite interest therein.
The cases are numerous where it has been held, that to constitute alienation of the property, a conveyance of the titie, and
nothing short of this, would amount to an alienation ; that "transfer of the title of property insured," means the title and ownership of property insured, and not the interest of the insured therein: Masters v. Madison County Ins. Co., 11 Barb. 624.
A sale by one partner to another is not such an alienation as
will avoid the policy, even under an express condition that the
policy shall become void: Angell on Ins. 197.
A mere change of interests or ownership among partners, where
no stranger is introduced, and no addition made to the number of
the insured-when there is no change in the condition or situation
of the property or risk-a mere assignment of his interest, by
one partner to the other, is obviously not within the principle or
motives on which the condition is founded : Pierce v. Nashua Fire
Ins. Co., 50 N. H. 297.
Henry F. West assigned his interest in the policy. What was
that interest ? Not any aliquot part of the whole, for they were
my el per tout" of the common stock of
partners seized " rp&
goods: West v. Skip, 1 Vesey Sr. 242.
It was his share of the capital stock remaining after satisfying
all par.tnership demands. When title to property, real or personal,
is in a partnership, and is owned by it, it is .clear that the conveyance by one partner of his interest conveys' no grester interest
than remains after all the demands against the firm are satisfied.
If this firm had been insolvent when the policy was assignedthat, counting the insurance money as part of the assets, it could
not pay its debts-then nothing was in fact assigned. For aught
the court knows, this may have been so in this case.
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The contracting parties were the insurers on the one hand, and
The language is clearly susceptible of the construction we have given. The one claimed by
defendant seems strained and unnatural, and calculated to defeat
rather than carry out the intention of the parties.
It does violence to all settled rules of construing contracts.
Conditions of this kind should not be extended by construction
-beyond the reasons for their adoption, especially when, as in this
case, it defeats the contract. The chief reason for requiring such
a stipulation is to guard against the introduction of a stranger,
who may not possess the fidelity or watchfulnes. required by the
insurers. The change should increase the hazard.
In a case of a clause of this kind it was held that a sale or conveyance to the assured does not defeat the policy, though within
the words of the proviso against the sale or transfer. The interest
of the insured being thereby increased, the case did not fall within
the reason and spirit of the proviso: May on Ins., sect. 275, and
cases cited.
To say that l. F. West & Co. shall not assign the policy, or
any interest therein, without consent, is a reasonable condition ;
but to say that the partners inter sese may not change their' respective interests, is not within the spirit and ieason of the clause.
The presumption is, that the company had faith in all the partners;
the increase of plaintiff's interests, as we have seen, would but
make them more watchful; the retiring partner no longer had a
motive to endanger the insurer; no stranger was introduced; no
one but those with whom the contract was made was left in control.
There being no adequate reason to support this enlarged construction, we cannot adopt it.
It is suggested that this clause was intended to secure the continuance of Henry F. West, in whom the company reposed special
confidence, and without him the policy would not have been issued.
In reply to this, we adopt the language of the New York Court
of Appeals, in Hoffman v. .Etna Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 411, in a similar case :" They testified their confidence in each of the assured, by issuing to them a policy, but did not choose to repose blind confidence
in others who might succeed to the ownership. The only evidence
of their confidence in either partner is in the fact that they contracted with all; and the theory is rather fanciful than sound

I. F. West & Co. on the other.
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-that they may -have intended to conclude a bargain with rogues on
the faith of a proviso that one honest man should be kept in the
- firm- to-watch them.
'. ," It was intended by the proviso to protect the company from a
.-continuing obligation to the assured; if the title and beneficial in.terest should pass to.others they might not be equally willing to
trust Words should not be taken in th6ir broadest import wheh
.they are-equally appropriate in a sense limited to the object the
parties had in view."
There is still another rule. equally at variance with the defendant's claim. Stipulations in a contract providing for disabilities
or forfeitures are to receive, when the intent is doubtful, a strict
construction against those for whose benefit they are introduced.
To seize on words introduced in the. policy as a safeguard, and
make them available to defeat the claim of the assured on the
theory of a technical forfeiture, is in no possible view permissible.
If the policy admits of such a construction, it is due to the dexterity of the draughtsman, and not to the meeting of the minds
of the parties: 32.N. Y. 414.
We conclude, therefore, that the clause under consideration, in
.connection with the facts disclosed, does not avoid the policy, and
that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover thereon.
Finally, the question arises-shall these plaintiffs recover the
whole that H. F. West & Co. might have recovered, or only their
individual shares ? Does the sale by Henry F. West avoid the
-policyas to his undivided interest ?
In Hobbs &1Hurley v. Memphis Lis. Co., 1 Sneed 444, a case
much like this as to its facts, it was held, as to the share or interest
of the retiring partner, the plaintiffs could not recover, but only
for their own interest in the firm; while in Hoffman v. -tna
Ins, Go., 32 N Y 415, 416, where the same question arose, it was
decided otherwise. - The court there say: " There is no reason why
the full measure of indemnity should be withheld from the plaintiffs, who were owners at the -date of the insurance, and sole owners
at the time of the loss." We concur in the reasoning of the court
in that case, and its conclusions of law on this point.
These plaintiffs were parties to the contract; they continued to
conduct the business contemplated by the policy; there was no
substantial change material to the risk, and none within the meaning of the clause under consideration. The policy was intended
-
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to protect the interest of each and all; and its language, fairly
construed, is in harmony with that intent.
We are aware that the conclusions we have reached are at
variance with the greater number of reported cases, but we believe
these conclusions rest on the firmer and more satisfactory ground
of sound principles, and that they are more conducive to substantial justice-the aim and end of all law.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.
SCOTT,

Chief Judge,

DAY, WHITMAN

and

WRIGHT, JJ.,

con-

curred.
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RICE v. MERRIMACK HOSIERY CO.
In proceedings in equity, whatever is essential to the rights of the plaintiff, and
is necessarily within his knowledge, must be alleged positively in the bill. Such
convenient degree of certainty must be adopted as will give the defendant full information of the case which he is called upon to answer.
The laws of a foreign state operate beyond its territorial limits only ex comitate.
The courts of a state where the laws of such foreign state are sought to be enforced, will use a sound discretion as to the extent and mode of that comity They
will not permit their tribunals to be used for the purpose of affording remedies
which are denied to parties in the jurisdiction of the state that enacted the law,
and which tend to operate with hardship on their own citizens and subjects.
A creditor of a corporation, created under the laws of Ohio, filed a bill to enforce the individual liability of the stockholders of the corporation. The corporation had no assets in this state, and none of its stockholders resided here. The
bill contained no recital by what remedial process the individual liability of stockholders is enforced in that state. Held, that comity does not require the courts
of this state, in the exercise of a judicial discretion, to give effect here to the
statutes of that state.
IN EQUITY.
The bill was as follows: William A. Rice, in
behalf of himself and others, creditors of the Merrimack Hosiery
Company, who shall come in and contribute to the expenses of
this suit, complains against the said Merrimack Hosiery Company,
an association of individuals claiming to be a body corporate and
politic, and. to have and possess certain corporate powers, under
and by virtue of the laws of the state of Ohio, and Rt. A.
iolden, of Cincinnati, in the county of Hamilton, and state of
Ohio, and Ira S. Holden, of Baltimore, in the county of Baltimore, and state of Maryland, and Edgar B. Thomas, of Indian-
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apolis, in the county of Marion, and state of Indiana, and William
Wood, of Cincinnati, aforesaid, and A. Shepard, of Compton,
in the county of Kenton, and state of Kentucky, as follows,
to wit: The said Holdens, Thomas, Wood and Shepard, as the
plaintiff is informed and believes, on the 2d day of July 1868,
associated themselves with one Charles W. Beal, of Cincinnati,
aforesaid, now deceased, and perhaps with sundry other persons
to the plaintiff unknown, under the laws of the state of Ohio, as
an association or joint-stock company, under the name of the
Merrimack Hosiery Company, claiming certain corporate rights
and powers under the laws of said state, with a capital stock claiming to be $50,000, with its principal office in Cincinnati aforesaid,
for the purpose of conducting in Bristol, in the county of G}rafton,
the business of manufacturing, by machinery, knit hosiery and
other goods, and each of said parties owned or claimed to own
stock in said company; that, by the laws of said state of Ohio, as
the plaintiff is informed and believes, each and every stockholder
in said company was then, and is now, liable for any debt due by
said company to any laborer employed by said company in carrying on its manufacturing business ; that, some time subsequent to
their organization as aforesaid, the said defendants, under the name
aforesaid, commenced the business of manufacturing, by machinery,
knit hosiery goods, at Bristol aforesaid, and the plaintiff and sundry other persons went into their employ as laborers in said manufacture ; that the manufacture so commenced was carried on by
them until some time in April, or the 1st of May 1872, when they
stopped the business of manufacturing aforesaid, after having
removed from the state most of their property, except the machinery with which said manufacturing had been carried on; and,
after repeated promises by the defendants and their agents that
the business should be resumed, but which promises were as often
broken, their property was attached, under process from the court
in this state, and on or about the 10th day of December 1872,
upon a petition of one of its creditors, the said Merrimack Hosiery
Company was adjudged a bankrupt under the laws of the United
States.
While the said company were doing business at Bristol aforesaid, and before its adjudication in bankruptcy as aforesaid, it
became justly indebted to the plaintiff, for labor and services done
and performed in and about its business, to a large amount, to wit,
VOL. XXIV.-77
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the sum of $1500, which is still due the plaintiff. And the plaintiff says that, at the time said debt was contracted as aforesaid,
nor since, has he any knowledge, except from reports, as to
whether said Iloldens, Thomas, Wood and Shepard, either alone
or with others, were associated together, under the laws of Ohio,
as a corporation, or whether they had corporate powers, or whether
the capital stock, if they had any, was paid in, or how it was
owned, or whether they were mere partners in business, and by
means thereof jointly and severally liable for all debts contracted
by them; or, if they were a corporation under the laws of said
state of Ohio, whether they had done and performed such acts as
by said laws would relieve them, as stockholders, from personal
liability for the plaintiff's debt; and as to all and singular of said
facts, queries and claims, the plaintiff prays the said defendants
may be compelled to prove the same by competent evidence, if
they claim the benefit thereof. And the plaintiff avers that all
said defendants had notice of his debt, contracted as aforesaid, and
a demand was made upon said company more than sixty days
before the filing of this bill, to wit, on the 1st day of November
1872; and, by means of the premises aforesaid, the plaintiff avers
that the defendants, whether as stockholders of the Merrimack
Hosiery Company or as partners, became and were, personally,
jointly and severally, liable to pay the same; yet they have not
paid tle same, nor any part thereof, but refuse so to do. And
the plaintiff also avers, that the said Ira S. Iolden owns a large
amount of real estate, to wit, of the value of $3000, situate in New
Ipswich, in tile county of Ilillsborough. in this state, over which
said court has jurisdiction.
Wherefore the plaintiff prays that the said defendants may come
to a just and fair account of the sum due the plaintiff upon the
demand aforesaid, and that they may be decreed to pay the
amount so due to the plaintiff, and for such other relief as may be
just.
The defendants demurred to the bill, and assigned the following
causes: 1. No equity on the part of the plaintiff is disclosed in
the bill. 2. The plaintiff has a plain and adequate remedy at
law. 3. Upon the allegations in the bill, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for. 4. The assignee of said hosiery
company, in bankruptcy, should be made a party. 5. The bill is,
in all respects, uncertain, informal and insufficient. 6. The plain-
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tiff's only remedy is to-be had in the proceeding in bankruptcy,
mentioned in the bill.
The questions raised by the demurrer were transferred to this
court by FOSTER, C. J.
Barnard,for the plaintiff.
Carpenterand Blair, for the defendants.
One of the causes of demurrer assigned is, that
SMITH, J.-I.
the bill is uncertain, informal and insufficient; and the bill is
clearly open to this objection. It is an elementary rule, that the
bill should state the right, title or claim of the plaintiff with
accuracy and clearness ; and should in like manner state the injury or grievance of which he complains, and the relief which he
asks of the court. The other material facts ought to be plainly
yet succinctly alleged, and with all necessary and convenient certainty as to the essential circumstances of time, place, manner and
other incidents : Story's Eq. Pl., sect. 241. Whatever is essential
to the rights of the plaintiff, and is necessarily within his knowledge, ought to be alleged positively. It is not a sufficient averment of a fact to state that a plaintiff " is so informed :" Lord
Uxbridge v. Staveland, 1 Vesey 56-or to say that a defendant
alleges and the plaintiff believes a statement to be true-Egremont
v. Cowell, 5 Beav. 620; nor is an allegation that the defendant
sets up certain pretences, followed by a charge that the contrary
of such pretences is the truth, a sufficient allegation or averment
of the facts which make up the counter statement: 1 Daniell's
If every fact necessary to entitle the
Ch. P1. & Prac. 412.
plaintiff to the relief prayed for is not distinctly and expressly
averred in the stating part of the bill, the defect cannot be pupplied by inference or reference to averments in other parts : Wright
v. Dame, 22 Pick. 55.
The bill charges that the defendants, with one Beal, since
deceased, organized an association or joint-stock .company, July 2d
1868, under the name of the Merrimack Hosiery Company, as the
plaintiff is informed and believes, and perhaps with sundry other
persons to the plaintiff unknown, under the laws of the state of
Ohio, with a capital stock claimed by them to be $50,000, for the
nurpose of manufacturing goods at Bristol in this county, and
having its principal place of office in Cincinnati, Ohio; that the
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defendants owned, or claimed to own, stock ini said company ; that
by the laws of Ohio, as the plaintiff is informed andI believes,
stockholders are liable for all debts due from the company to its
laborers ; that the plaintiff has no knowledge, except from reports,
whlether the defendants are a corporation or not; if a corporation,
whether they ever had any capital stock, and, if any, whether it
was paid in, or how it was owned; and, if a corporation, whether
the defendants have done such acts as by the laws of Ohio would
relieve them, as stockholders, from personal liability to the plaintiff; or whether they were mere partners in business, jointly and
severally liable for all debts contracted by them. As to all and
singular of said facts, queries and claims, the plaintiff prays that
the defendants may be compelled to prove the same by competent
evidence, if they claim the benefit thereof.
These allegations are so general and uncertain as to draw with
them the consequences and mischiefs of uncertainty in pleadings.
The defects, we think, are fatal to the objects of the bill. There
is no distinct allegation that the defendants are a corporation.
The statement is made merely upon the plaintiff's information and
belief; so, also, is the charge that the stockholders are liable under
the laws of Ohio for the debts due fiom the company to its
laborers. Besides, the allegation that the plaintiff has no knowledge, except from reports, whether the defendants are a corporation, or whether they had any capital stock, or whether it was paid
in and who owned it, or whether the defendants were partners, is
altogether too vague and uncertain. What allegations does this
demurrer admit ? or, if this bill should be taken pro co?fesso,
what would it confess ? Clearly, that the plaintiff has been informed and believes as he charges, and not that what be has been
informed and believes to be true is true. The plaintiff is bound
to state in his bill a ease upon vhich, if admitted in the answer
or proved at the hearing, the court can make a decree: 1 Daniell's
Ch. P1. & Prac. 412. In Story's Eq. Pl., sect. 255, it is laid
down, " That every fact essential to the plaintiff's title to maintain the bill and obtain the relief must be stated in the bill, otherwise the defect will be fatal. For no facts are properly in issue
unless charged in the bill, and, of course, no proofs can be generally offered of facts not in the bill ; nor can relief be granted for
matters not charged, although they may be apparent from other
parts of the pleadings and evidence, for the court pronounces its
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decree secundcum allegata et probata. The reason is, that the defendant may be apprised by the bill what the suggestions and
allegations are against which he is to prepare his defence," and
because the court cannot render judgment except upon what appears
on the record.
One or two examples from those found in Story, derived from
adjudged cases, will illustrate these principles. A bill was brought
to perpetuate a right of common and of way. The charge in the
bill was, that the tenants, owners and occupiers of'certain lands
of a manor, in right thereof or otherwise, from time whereof the
memory of man is not to the contrary, had, and of right ought to
have, a common of pasture, &c., in a certain waste, &c. The bill
was held bad on demurrer; for the manner in which the right of
common was claimed was not set forth with any certainty; it was
not set forth as common appendant or appurtenant, but as that
"or otherwise," which was no specification at all, and left any sort
of right open to proof: Uresset v. MZitton, 1 Yes., Jr. 449 ; s. c.,
Bro. Ch. R. 481.
So where a bill sought a discovery and delivery up of title deeds
to the plaintiff, and alleged that, at the time of the marriage of
his father and mother, his mother was seised and possessed or
entitled to divers freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, as one
of the co-heiresses of her father, or under his marriage settlement,
or his will, or codicil, or by some such or other means; and that,
upon the marriage of the plaintiff's father and mother, or before,
or at some time after, the said marriage, some settlement or settlements was or were executed, wherahy all Dr some parts of the said
estates were conveyed, upon certain trusts and purposes, in such a
manner as that estates for life were given to his father and mother,
or one of them, or at least an estate for life to his father, with a
provision, by way of jointure or otherwise, for his mother, who
died in the lifetime of his father-remainder to the first son of his
father and mother, or to their first and other sons severally and
successively, or in some manner; so that the plaintiff, upon the
death of his father and mother, became seised or entitled to all or
most of the estates, &c., either in fee or absolutely, or as tenantfor
life. or in tail in possession, or in some other manner, as would
appear by the deeds, &c., in the defendant's possession. Upon
demurrer, the bill was held bad for vagueness and uncertainty;
andl that the defendant could not plead to it, but must discover all.
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deeds relating to their estates : Roqves v. 1?yves, 3 Yes. 343. That
case, in the looseness of its statements and in the uncertainty of the
facts essential for the plaintiff to know in order to make out his
case, seems to find its parallel in the one now before us. In short,
the rule, as laid down, is as follows: "It is absolutely necessary
that such a convenient degree of certainty should be adopted as may
serve to give the defendant full information of the case which he
is called upon to answer: 1 Daniell's Ch. P1. and Prac. 421
Cresset v. Mitton, supra ; Worniuld v. DeLisle, 3 Beav. 18.
But, if we should assume that the defendants were duly organized
into a corporation under the laws of Ohio, and if we should assume
that the statutes of Ohio, if they had been recited in the bill,
would show what the plaintiff has alleged-that each stockholder
is liable for any debt due by the corporation to any laborer employed by it in carrying on its manufacturing business-there
would still remain insuperable difficulties in maintaining this suit.
The laws of a foreign state do not operate beyond its territorial
limits ex proprio vigore, but only ex comitate. The courts of a
state, where the laws of a foreign state are sought to be enforced,
will use a sound discretion as to the extent and mode of that comity ;
they will not permit their tribunals to be used for the purpose of
affording remedies which are denied to parties in the jurisdiction
of the state that enacted the law, and which tend to operate with
hardship on their own citizens and subjects: Erickson v. _Nesnitht,
15 Gray 221. The liability which the plaintiff seeks to enforce is
a mere creature of the statute, having none of the elements of a
contract, whether express or implied: it is a naked, statutory
liability, entirely unknown to the common law, for the indebtedness
of the corporation however it may accrue, whether from the breach
of a contract or the commission of a tort. The stockholder is not
liable upon the contract in the one case, nor for the tort in the
other, but, under the statute, for the debt against the corporation
which may grow out of either : flicks v. Burns, 38 N. II. 141.
In order to arrive at a just conclusion in this case, it is important
to know by what proceedings this liability is enforced in Ohio.
By the statutes of New Hampshire, proceedings to enforce the
liability of btockholders, under our laws, must be by bill in
chancery. A creditor, seeking to enforce it, must join ill the suit
all the parties in interest who can be affected by the decree; the
suit must be prosecuted for the benefit of all the creditors, and not
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for a portion of them. All the stockholders who can be reached
by the process must be made defendants. The corporation itself
must also be joined; and thus, by avoiding a multiplicity of suits,
the whole liability of the corporation is apportioned among the
solvent stockholders, who can be reached by the process of the
court, and by the decree each stockholder is compelled to pay his
proportionate share of the debts: and thus, in one suit, the affairs
of the corporation are practically wound up, and its burdens distributed equitably among' the shareowners: Hadle'y v. _U88uell,.
40 N. H. 109; Erikson v. Nesmith, 46 N. H. 371.
In Erickson v. Nesmith, 15 Gray 221, which was a suit at law
brought to enforce the personal liability of a stockholder, residing
in Massachusetts, of a corporation established in New Hampshire,
for a debt of the corporation, the Supreme Court of that state, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, refused to permit such suit to
be maintained, upon the ground that the plaintiffs were seeking to
enforce the liability against a.citizen of Mass'achusetts, by a remedy
denied to them in the courts of the state whose statutes created
such liability; and because, if the suit could be maintained, it
would operate with greater hardship on the citizens of Massachusetts than the remedy provided by the statute itself, and which
alone they could pursue in New Hampshire.
The same creditors subsequently brought a suit in equity against
Nesmith aud others, stockholders of the same corporation, residing
in Massachusetts (reported 4 Allen 233), said suit being brought
in behalf of all the creditors, to enforce their clims against the
stockholders, undor the provisions of the statutes of this state
making the stockholders individually liable for the debts of the
corporation. It was held that the bill could not be maintained.
In the opinion of the court, DEWEY, J., remarked as follows: "If
this be so, we perceive at once strong reasons why such 'a'
bill
should be brought inthe state which created the corporation, and
where the same is located by the express terms of its charter, and
where its place of business is. " The effect of waintaining such a
bill is to draw before the court all the creditors of the corporation,
all the stockholders, and, necessarily, as we should suppose, the
principal debtor-the corporation itself. The fact of the residence
of a single stockholder in Massachusetts, who might be liable in a
New Hampshire corporation in common with a hundred stockholders residing there, would, upon that hypothesis, transfer to our
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jurisdiction all such stockholders and all the creditors, and authorize us to hear and adjust all conflicting questions as to the indebtedness of the corporation, who were stockholders, and what were
the equities between them.
" Great practical difficulties meet us at once. There are strong
reasons for holding that, in case of an existing corporation, the
debt sought to be recovered of a stockholder should be first established by a judgment of court. If this be doubtful, it is, at least,
necessary that, before such debt be established by the proceedings
in the bill in equity, the corporation should have been made a
party to the bill: Bogardus v. Rosendale lHfanuf. Co., 3 Seld.
151. But we have no jurisdiction that will reach such corporation
out of this commonwealth, and having no assets here; and the
same is true of the stockholders residing in New Hampshire. A
bill in equity in Massachusetts is, therefore, not the remedy
intended to be prescribed by the statute of New Hampshire creating and regulating the liability of stockholders in a manufacturing
corporation in New lhampshire."
In the suit between the same parties in this state, reported in
46 N. II. 371. SAIRM1.:NT, J., in commenting upon the above decision
of the court in Massachusetts, said, "The result of the suit in
The plainMassachusetts was what might have been expected.
tiffs, in going to another state to try to enforce upon its inhabitants

the special provisions of the laws of New latunp4hire, would be
very likely to find their mistake, that the stockholders in Massachusetts did not belong to any corporation in that state to which
the Massachusetts laws, to which alone they were amenable, had
any application."
The defendant corporation was organized under the statutes of
Ohio ; it has its principal place of business there ; the most of its
stockholders probably reside there; if it has any assets, they will
probably be found in that state; none of the stockholders are
residents of this state ; the corporation has no assets here ; it has
been adjudged a bankrupt; only one of its stockholders has any
property within this state ; and there is no recital in the bill by
which we can he informed by what remedial process the individual
liability of stockholders is enforced in that state. Under such
circumtances I do not think comity requires us, in the exercise
of a judicial discretion, to give effect to the foreign statutes here.
Being without information as to the remedy afforded in Ohio, it

